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This paper reviews the progress with increasing renewable energy supply in 
the UK since 1990 with a particular focus on recent developments. The UK 
is regarded as a country where the considerable potential for renewable 
energy2, relative to other major European countries, has failed to be realised. 
It is also frequently suggested that the UK needs to change its policies to 
renewables to look more like that in Germany or Spain (e.g. Mitchell, 2007). 
 
The aim of this paper is to look at the UK’s renewable energy policy in the 
context of its overall decarbonisation and energy policies. This will allow us 
to explore the precise nature of the ‘failure’ of UK renewables policy and to 
suggest policy changes which might be appropriate in light of the UK’s 
institutional and resource endowments. Our focus will be on the electricity 
sector both in terms of renewable generation and to a lesser extent the 
facilitating role of electricity distribution and transmission networks. 
However we will highlight the interactions between the electricity, heat and 
transport sectors in the UK within the overall decarbonisation policy context. 
 
We will suggest that the precise nature of the failure of UK policy is rather 
more to do with societal preferences and the available mechanisms for 
                                                 
1 This paper is a longer version of a chapter in Harnessing Renewable Energy edited by 
Jorge Padilla and Richard Schmalensee (to be published by RFF Press an imprint of 
Earthscan). The author acknowledges the financial support of Gas Natural in writing this 
paper (and LECG in managing the process) and ongoing intellectual support of the ESRC 
Electricity Policy Research Group. Bin Feng provided excellent research assistance. The 
comments of Boaz Mozelle, David Newbery , Jorge Padilla, Dick Schmalensee, Steve 
Smith, Jon Stern and an anonymous referee are acknowledged. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
2 The definition of renewables used in this chapter is that in the EU Draft Renewables 
Directive ‘‘energy from renewable sources’ means renewable non-fossil energy sources: 
wind, solar, geothermal, wave, tidal, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment 
plant gas and biogases’ (European Commission, 2008, p.21). 
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encouraging social acceptability than it is to do with financial support 
mechanisms. Radical changes to current policy are required, but they must 
be careful to be institutionally appropriate to the UK. Calls to ‘just do it’ 
with respect to delivery of larger quantities of renewables are economically 
irresponsible and highly likely to backfire in terms of achievement of 
ultimate policy goals such as decarbonisation and energy security. What we 
suggest is that current policies exhibit an unnecessarily low benefit to cost 
ratio, and that new policies for renewable deployment must pay close 
attention to cost effectiveness. 
 
UK renewable energy policy exists in a wider energy policy context. The 
UK’s stated energy policy can be summed up as aiming to achieve ‘secure, 
affordable and low-carbon energy’.3  It therefore has three identifiable 
priorities: addressing climate change, providing energy security and keeping 
energy bills down. These policy objectives are naturally in tension. The first 
two are expensive, while tackling the third entails keeping prices down, if 
not for everyone, for a significant minority of poor consumers. Between 
1990 and 2003 domestic electricity prices fell significantly in real terms in 
the UK (by around 30% per unit), but have risen by around 40% from 2003-
2008.4 The number of households defined as being in energy (or fuel) 
poverty (spending 10% or more of total expenditure on heating and power) 
has risen from a low of 2 million in 2003 to 3.5 million in 20065 out of a 
total of around 25 million households6. This has put a strain on the ability of 
richer consumers to simultaneously finance poor consumers (via bill 
payments to company support schemes)7 and expensive policies arising from 
climate change and energy security objectives.  EU directives have also 
provided significant shape to UK energy policy, providing the basis for 
                                                 
3 See  http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/uk_supply/uk_supply.aspx, 
Accessed 25 August 2009. 
4 Source: Table 2.2.1 (st), available at  
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/source/prices/prices.aspx. Accessed 25 
August 2009. 
5 Source: http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file48037.pdf, Accessed 25 August 2009. 
6 Source: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1866, Accessed 25 August 
2009. 
7 See 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/FactSheets/Documents1/updatedhouseholdbills09.pdf 
Accessed 20 October 2009. This indicates that in August 2009, 8% of a typical electricity 
bill and 3% of a typical gas bill was being charged to support environmental schemes, of 
which the most expensive were targeted on lower income consumers. 
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targets to 2020 for CO2 reduction and renewable electricity generation 
share. 
 
The UK policy context is nicely illustrated by Scrase and Watson (2009) 
who discuss the conflict between a desire to take a policy lead on carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) and the requirement to keep the costs of a 
potentially very expensive policy down. Initially the government were 
considering picking a winner and supporting a project proposed by the oil 
company BP, only to realise that it would have to have an open competition 
to select a CCS project. Government policies will always be tempered by the 
reality of the need to control costs (and to obey EU rules on competition), 
especially when those costs are shown to be high relative to their political 
benefit. 
 
The paper is organised in seven sections. Section 1 looks at the overall 
decarbonisation policy context. Section 2 reviews the potential for 
renewables in the UK. Section 3 discusses the place of renewables within the 
energy system out to 2050 drawing on some recent work by the UK energy 
regulator, Ofgem. Section 4 reviews policy towards renewables since 1990 
with a particular focus on recent developments. Section 5 examines the 
evidence on the performance of UK policy compared with that of other 
countries. Section 6 uses a new institutional economics perspective to 
discuss what sorts of policies might be right for the UK in the light of the 
evidence. Section 7 returns to the issue of overall policy towards 
decarbonisation and the place of renewables within this.  
 
Section 1: Overall decarbonisation policy in the UK 
 
The passage of the Climate Change Act and the introduction of carbon 
budgeting represent a substantial institutional commitment on the part of the 
UK to keeping the government accountable for maintaining the UK on a 
credible pathway to long-term targets. The UK has one of the most 
ambitious decarbonisation policies in the world as embodied in the 2008 
Climate Change Act8. 
 
                                                 
8 Source: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/ukpga_20080027_en_1 Accessed 28 
August 2009. UK carbon targets are net of trading, and hence can include carbon credits 
purchased from abroad. 
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This policy consists of a commitment to reducing net Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions by 80% by 2050 (on 1990 levels) and an intermediate target 
reduction of 26% by 2020. This target is supported by five year carbon 
budgets (the first period being 2008-2012 inclusive). These budgets are 
formulated by civil servants within government (initially the Office of 
Climate Change) supported by a report from the independent Committee on 
Climate Change. Government ministers have a statutory duty to introduce 
policies which support the achievement of the targets. The first report of the 
Committee on Climate Change was published in December 2008 (hereafter 
referred to as ‘The First Report’). This gave indicative budgets for the 
periods 2008-12, 2013-17 and 2018-22. The budget for any period beyond 
this must be set at least 12 years ahead. 
 
The report was then followed up by a significant discussion in the HM 
Treasury Budget for 2009 of policy measures aimed at supporting the 
achievement of the decarbonisation targets in the light of the First Report 
(see HM Treasury, 2009). The announced measures included support for 
green manufacturing, improvements to the renewable support for offshore 
wind, increased funding for combined heat and power and a support 
mechanism for up to 4 CCS plants. The legislation implies that if the 
government were to fail to enact appropriate policies to keep the UK on 
track to achieve its targets this could result in legal action against Ministers 
by third parties. It remains to be seen on what grounds any action would be 
likely to be successful given the less than direct link between specific 
government policy and impact on a national GHG target. 
 
The First Report was notable because it gave numerical detail on the 
potential contribution of various sectors to decarbonisation and in doing so 
set indicative targets for different parts of the economy. It laid out a target of 
21% for the reduction of GHGs to 2020 (31% in the event of a Global Deal 
in Copenhagen in December 2008) and also suggested that complete 
decarbonisation of the electricity sector should be envisaged by 2030 and 
that this implied 30-40% of electricity from renewables by 2020. The 2030 
targets for the electricity sector were significantly more ambitious than had 
previously been envisaged.  
 
For reference in 2008 UK GHG emissions were 623.8m tonnes of CO2e 
(CO2 equivalent units), which is 20% below the 1990 baseline of 779.9m 
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tonnes.9 This meant that the UK is the only major European country to have 
already met and exceeded its 2012 Kyoto target for emissions reduction 
target (which was 12.5%).10 It is however worth pointing out that the UK 
target is the result of negotiations within the EU to share out the Kyoto 
negotiated EU wide target, and that the baseline date of 1990 is very 
favourable to the UK. This is because it coincides with the privatisation of 
the UK power industry which led to the ‘dash for gas’ which resulted in an 
unintended environmental windfall as dirtier coal fired plants were displaced 
from the system (see Newbery and Pollitt, 1997).This favourable starting 
place in which the UK finds itself is certainly a major factor in its relative 
enthusiasm for decarbonisation11.The EU Renewables Directive  
(2009/28/EC) further commits the UK to a 15.4% target for renewables 
contribution to total final energy consumption in 2020 as part of the EU’s 
overall 20% renewables by 2020 target. This further target is acknowledged 
and accepted within the Committee on Climate Change’s First Report. The 
UK also has a specific annual target for the percentage of electricity from 
renewables out to 2015 as part of its Renewables Obligation Certificate 
(ROC) scheme (discussed in Section 4). 
 
Two examples of the detail in the First Report are given below. 
                                                 
9 Source: 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/globatmos/download/ghg_ns_20090326.p
df Accessed 27 August 2009. 
10 See Table 1 in http://www.eea.europa.eu/pressroom/newsreleases/GHG2006-en 
11 It is worth noting that Germany also favours the 1990 baseline date, as this coincides 
with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the rapid decarbonisation of the former East 
Germany due to industrial decline and improved environmental standards. 
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Figure 1: Scenarios for the Electricity Generation Sector for 2020 
 
 
 
Source: CCC (2008, p.203) 
 
Figure 1 shows the contribution of renewables projected within three 
scenarios for decarbonisation policy. The recommendations of the 
Committee suggested Scenarios 1 and 2 were the most plausible (because 
Scenario 3 assumes significantly more CCS). The share of renewables is 
30% in total electricity generation in scenario 1, while scenario 2 gives the 
same level of overall emissions with 22.5% renewables and extra nuclear 
generation to make up the shortfall in low carbon generation capacity. 
 
Figure 2 shows the contribution of different renewable technologies to the 
achievement of scenario 1. This shows that offshore wind, onshore wind and 
biomass (both in its own right and co-fired with coal) will make significant 
contributions by 2020. It also indicates a marginal role for marine power. 
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Figure 2: Marginal Cost of Abatement Curve (MACC) in Scenario 1 to 
achieve overall decarbonisation target for 2020. 
 
 
Source: CCC (2008, p.206) 
 
The Committee on Climate Change modelling suggests the overall cost of 
the electricity decarbonisation policy will be around 0.2% of GDP p.a. to 
2020 and could result in price rises of up to 25% for domestic customers 
relative to no policy intervention. 
 
The First Report also discusses the potential for the direct reduction of 
emissions from buildings rather than larger grid connected electricity. This 
involves a combination of renewable heat and micro-generation. For 
residential buildings it identifies a potential contribution of 14% reduction in 
heat emissions via a combination of biomass, solar hot water, heat pumps 
and biogas by 2020. In addition there may be small contributions from PV 
and other sources for micro-generation of electricity. The potential for 
decarbonisation via the direct and indirect emissions from residential 
buildings is given in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Marginal Cost of Abatement Curve in Residential Buildings to 
2020 – Technical Potential. 
 
Source: CCC (2008, p.221) 
 
Similar technologies are expected to deliver savings in CO2 in the non-
residential and industrial sectors. 
 
In the transport sector significant CO2 savings are expected from the uptake 
of hybrid and electric vehicles (saving 8m tonnes CO2 p.a. by 2020) and 
from the use of biofuels (saving 5m tonnes CO2 p.a.). Thus it is clear that 
the transport and electricity sectors may increasingly interact on CO2 
abatement as low carbon electricity will be required to power electric 
vehicles while energy crops could either be configured for use in power 
stations or in vehicles. 
 
Recently the newly created responsible government ministry - the 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC, 2009a) - published a 
UK Renewable Energy Strategy. In line with the First Report, this suggested 
that more than 30% of electricity should be generated from renewables by 
2020, as well as 12% of heat and 10% of transport energy (in order to meet 
EU targets). 
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The UK’s targets are ambitious by historical standards of decarbonisation. 
Between 1979 and 1987 France reduced its national carbon emissions from 
fossil fuels by 30%12 as its nuclear power programme increased the share of 
nuclear power plants in total electricity production from 20% to 70%. If one 
thinks that this programme was many years in the planning and initial 
building and was itself very ambitious AND that it only achieved the first 
30% of an 80% decarbonisation target one gets an idea of how ambitious the 
UK’s targets are.13 
 
The UK’s commitment to decarbonisation is likely to lead to a relatively 
tight domestic policy with strong pressure for the purchasing of renewable 
electricity and CO2 permits from abroad. In 2007 the UK was a net 
purchaser of CO2 permits to the tune of 26 m tonnes, or 3% of its 1990 
GHG level14. It also purchased energy via the interconnector with France 
(3% of total electricity delivered) which may have displaced higher carbon 
energy in the UK15 and was one of the largest net importers of 
internationally traded bio-energy (mainly for co-firing in coal fired power 
plants and for blending in petrol)16.  All of these have some scope for 
expansion in terms of achieving the net decarbonisation of the UK economy. 
 
Given the ambitious targets for decarbonisation and renewable energy in the 
UK, it seems highly likely that nationally these targets will be missed 
(certainly on renewables). In these circumstances serious consideration will 
be given to meeting the targets via net purchases of CO2 or green energy 
certificates from abroad (e.g. funding CCS in China). Indeed, if additionality 
could be clearly established this would seem to be a very sensible option 
given that at the margin such purchases would be much cheaper than the 
price of domestic alternatives. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Source: http://cdiac.ornl.gov/ftp/trends/emissions/fra.dat. 
13 Though it could be argued that a 40 year time frame does give more scope for learning 
and avoids the need for premature scrapping of existing assets. 
14 Source: 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/globatmos/download/ghg_ns_20090203.p
df Accessed on 27 August, 2009. 
15 Sources: DUKES (2009, p.122). 
16See Perry and Rosillo-Calle (2008) and Junginger et al. (2008). 
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Section 2: Potential for Renewable energy in the UK 
 
A defining feature of the UK is the considerable potential it has for 
renewable energy relative to its demand. The UK has some of the best wind, 
tidal and wave resources in Europe, as well as affording opportunities for 
biomass and solar. The technical potential of each of these resources is very 
great, but the estimated ‘economic’ potential of major technologies are given 
below. UK electricity supplied in 2008 was 380 TWh17. 
 
Table 1: Estimates of the potentials for different renewable technologies in 
UK  
 
Technology Category 
 
Technology Detail Annual Potential 
Wind power Onshore 50 TWh 
 Offshore 100 TWh 
Bioenergy 
 
Biomass 41 TWh 
Geothermal Ground source heat 
pumps
8 TWh 
Hydro Large scale 5 TWh 
 Small scale 10 TWh
PV Retro fitted and 
Building integrated
>1 TWh 
Marine Wave energy 33 TWh 
 Tidal barrage 50 TWh 
 Tidal stream 18 TWh
 
Total 
  
~316 TWh 
Source: Jamasb, Nuttall et al., 2008, p.81-82. 
 
In addition the UK has low carbon options for carbon capture and for 
nuclear. The UK has up to 1000 years worth of  storage capacity of CO2 in 
the North Sea and currently generates around 13% of its electricity from 
nuclear power18. The UK has endowments of coal and oil and gas (though all 
three are depleting). Thus carbon capture and storage and nuclear power are 
likely to compete with renewables to play a part in decarbonisation of the 
                                                 
17 Source: DUKES 2009, Table 5.5. 
18 Source: DUKES (2009, p.122). 
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electricity sector. The UK is already committed to an auction for one 
demonstration CCS plant and is reviewing designs for a new generation of 
nuclear power plants. Electricity demand growth is growing slowly at 
around 1% a year (pre-economic crisis) and energy efficiency measures - 
such as the elimination of filament light bulbs from 201119 and the 
introduction of smart metering for all electricity customers by 2020 - seem 
likely to moderate demand growth. 
 
David MacKay (2008, p.109) casts his presentation of the likely contribution 
of renewables to UK decarbonisation in the context of delivering the current 
level of energy consumption per person per day of 125 KWh/day/person. He 
suggests that renewables contribution is likely to be only 18.3 
KWh/day/person made up of: hydro 0.3 kWh/d/p; tidal 3 kWh/d/p; offshore 
wind 4 kWh/d/p; biomass 4 kWh/d/p; solar PV 2 kWh/d/p (+an additional 2 
kWh/d/p from solar hot water) and onshore wind 3 kWh/d/p. Thus 
renewable energy would contribute around 15% towards total 
decarbonisation. MacKay’s analysis is helpful in that illustrates that a big 
contribution towards current electricity provision, comes in the context of 
electricity only being the source of around one third of current emissions of 
GHGs. 
 
The exact mix of different renewable technologies, CCS fitted to coal or gas 
fired plants, nuclear and demand reduction in the UK energy mix will 
depend on the relative costs of the different technologies. Kannan (2009) 
shows the impact of different assumptions on the significance of CCS in UK 
decarbonisation and hence the implications for other sources of 
decarbonisation. Demand reduction technologies are the cheapest GHG 
abatement technology at the moment20, though demand reduction measures 
suffer from well known institutional barriers to adoption (Grubb and Wilde, 
2008). Nuclear is probably the next cheapest. Among the renewable 
technologies in the UK onshore wind, biomass and offshore wind are lowest 
cost at scale to 2020. Table 2 shows some cost sensitivities for 2005 in the 
UK. 
 
                                                 
19 Source: DECC Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC, 2009c, p.72). This also been 
recently been agreed at the EU level. 
20 See Figure 3 above for an illustration of the significance of this in residential buildings. 
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Table 2: Examples of estimated current costs of technologies for the UK 
 
Technology 
 
Technology Detail p/kWh (2005) 
Nuclear Generation III 3.04-4.37 
Gas CCGT With CCS 3.65-6.78 
Coal IGCC with CCS 3.5-5.67 
Wind Onshore 4.68-8.89 
 Offshore 5.62-13.3 
Source: Jamasb, Nuttall et al., 2008, p.75. 
Note: the spread of estimates reflects ranges in the discount rate, capital cost, 
fuel and carbon prices and other sensitivies. 
 
The above table illustrates large uncertainty in the costs of building new 
plant even with established technologies. For wind this reflects the 
importance of exact location which determines both build costs and the 
available wind. The range of costs illustrates substantial overlap under 
favourable vs. unfavourable circumstances for any pair of technologies. 
However it is important to point out that this uncertainty over actual costs 
for current new build, does call into question projections of costs to 2020. 
For instance Dale et al., (2004) assume onshore and offshore new build costs 
of £650 per KW and £1000 per KW in scenarios with 25% energy from 
wind. The most recent (albeit pre-recession) wind parks are currently 
coming in at nearer £1000 per KW and £2500 per KW (see Blanco, 2009, 
and Synder and Kaiser, 2009). This is somewhat concerning (given a return 
to macroeconomic growth) for the likely projected costs of renewable 
scenarios to 2020, especially given that the costs of electricity (which will 
include cumulative subsidy commitments to renewables) in 2020 will still 
likely reflect, to some extent, the cumulative cost of all wind capacity 
installed since 2005. 
 
As Jamasb, Nuttall et al. (2008) note, a key determinant of the relative 
attractiveness of different technologies will be the degree of learning in costs 
and that this depends on their current stage of development. Foxon et al. 
(2005) note the different stages of development that the various renewable 
technologies available to the UK are at. Wind costs can be expected to fall as 
capacity increases significantly around the world, however the prospects for 
learning in hydro and tidal barrages are low (limiting their ultimate scope for 
expansion). The additional costs of fitting CCS are difficult to estimate due 
to lack of information, while the scope for learning may be constrained by 
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the maturity of the different elements of the CCS process (see Odenberger et 
al., 2008). This is in addition to the difficulty of reconciling all the interested 
parties (Drake, 2009). PV, tidal stream and other marine technologies offer 
the greatest potential for cost falls from their current cost given low current 
levels of output and the implied scope for cost reduction21 
 
SKM (2008) provides estimates of the possible cost of decarbonisation of 
the electricity sector by 2020. 
 
Table 3: Costs and Benefits of Electricity Sector decarbonisation by 2020 
(2008 prices). 
 
 
Source: SKM (2008, p.8) 
 
Table 3 shows that renewables could impose significant total costs on the 
electricity system. The capital costs of connecting offshore wind in 
particular could involve up to £15bn of expenditure (more than the total cost 
of generation under a conventional scenario). The cost of balancing and 
intermittency could rise by up to £7/MWh or 10% of total system costs. The 
UK may have the wind resources but they will have significant cost 
                                                 
21  See for instance DECC (2009d, p.92), which shows projected cost falls of 
PV of 70% to 2050 against only 22% for coal fired CCS. 
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implications for the system, raising average electricity costs by up to 40% 
against baseline. 
 
It is clear that while the UK does have significant potential for renewables, 
there is a significant amount of uncertainty about the cost at which 
renewable generation can be delivered. Large quantities of renewable 
generation will significantly raise average electricity costs and be subject to 
significant cost variance. Support mechanisms will need to be carefully 
designed both to provide enough incentive and to ensure that delivered 
capacity is not excessively expensive. 
 
 
Section 3: Renewables in scenarios for the 2050 electricity system 
 
While the path to 2020 has been significantly examined in the context of the 
First Report of the Committee on Climate Change, there remains substantial 
uncertainty about the path out to 2050. The path to 2020 seems likely to be 
dominated by grid connected generation, with a significant role for large 
wind parks, both on- and increasingly off-shore. However the Great Britain 
electricity regulator, Ofgem, recently presented a range of scenarios (Ault et 
al., 2008a) for the electricity system out to 2050 which highlight the 
significant amount of technological and economic uncertainty out to 2050. 
These scenarios focussed on the range of possibilities for the development of 
electricity networks within the context of Ofgem’s role as economic 
regulator of electricity transmission and distribution networks. Five 
scenarios were developed: Big T&D, DNOs, Energy Service Companies, 
Microgrids and Multi-purpose networks. The scenarios are briefly described 
in Table 4. 
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Table 4: The Five LENS Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These five scenarios give rise to very different electricity networks in 2050. 
For instance Figure 4 illustrates the difference between the two most 
different scenarios: Big T&D and Micro-grids. 
 
 
Big Transmission and Distribution (T&D) – in which transmission system operators (TSOs) are at the 
centre of networks activity. Network infrastructure development and management continues as 
expected from today’s patterns, while expanding to meet growing demand and the deployment of 
renewable generation. 
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) – in which energy services companies are at the centre of 
developments in networks, doing all the work at the customer side. Networks contract with such 
companies to supply network services. 
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) – in which distribution system operators take on a central 
role in managing the electricity system. Compared to today, distribution companies take much more 
responsibility for system management including generation and demand management, quality and 
security of supply, and system reliability, with much more distributed generation. 
Micro-grids – in which consumers are at the centre of activity in networks. The self-sufficiency 
concept has developed very strongly in power and energy supplies. Electricity consumers take much 
more responsibility for managing their own energy supplies and demands. As a consequence, 
microgrid system operators (MSOs) emerge to provide the system management capability to enable 
customers to achieve this with the new technologies. 
Multi-purpose Networks – in which network companies at all levels respond to emerging policy and 
market requirements. TSOs still retain the central role in developing and managing networks but 
distribution companies also have a more significant role to play. The network is characterised by 
diversity in network development and management approaches. 
Source: Ault et al., 2008, Forward by Stuart Cook. 
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Figure 4: Two LENS scenarios for 2050 
 
 
Key to symbols: 
 
Source: Ault et al, 2008a, p.iv,v,viii. 
 
Under the Big transmission and distribution scenario the electricity grid is 
substantially reinforced to support an offshore grid and large amounts of 
intermittent wind generation on and offshore. By contrast the Micro-grids 
scenario involves large amounts of local and micro-generation and a grid not 
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much bigger than today. The striking difference between these two scenarios 
is the size of the network and the scale of electricity generation capacity. 
 
The Micro-grids scenario involves significant matching of local supply and 
demand via smart metering and smart grids and exploits the considerable 
potential for micro-grids opened up by new technology. Abu-Shaikh et al. 
(2006) discuss a world where a combination of domestic PV, micro-CHP 
and a small battery could result in a micro-grid that is potentially 
independent from the large scale electricity network. This would reduce the 
demand for and cost of centralised generation investments and integrated 
networks for those consumers. The degree to which this sort of scenario 
requires active individual, as opposed to community or company led 
initiative, can vary (Sauter and Watson, 2007).  However the micro-potential 
is large: technically solar PV could already provide 51% of domestic 
electricity supply and solar thermal 33% of domestic hot water requirements, 
even though the current economic costs are prohibitive.  
 
Clearly with technological breakthroughs leading to drastic cost reductions, 
uptake might be rapid and driven by individual consumers rather than 
traditional utilities. However there remains substantial inertia in existing 
electricity and heat systems, high new technology costs and a lack of 
government commitment to funding significant learning (Allen et al., 2008 
and Watson et al., 2008). Micro-grids requiring community involvement (i.e. 
those where there is shared use of local generation or heat, and hence high 
levels of local interdependency) face significant social barriers such as the 
reliance on identification with the concept of community (Walker et al., 
2007) and the fact that while many are positively disposed, few in the 
community would want to take the lead in organisation (Rogers et al., 2008). 
However there might be significant advantages for the likelihood of getting 
planning permission, willingness to pay and in achieving local development 
objectives from the promotion of small-scale community energy (Hain et al., 
2005). There are also high transaction costs for the connection of small scale 
distributed and micro-generation with the distribution grid and difficulties 
for new energy service companies wishing to make use of a combination of 
existing grid assets and their own investments (Pollitt, 2009). 
 
The supporting MARKAL modelling work for the LENS scenarios has 
quantified the interactions between demand for electricity, heat and transport 
and the significant potential impact of the arrival of electric vehicles (Ault et 
al., 2008b). The arrival of competitively priced private electric vehicles is 
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associated with substantial decarbonisation of the transport sector while not 
significantly increasing the demand for electricity (because electric vehicles 
are energy efficient). Electricity and heat are connected by substantial 
increases in combined heat and power (from biomass) in some scenarios. 
Under the modelled micro-grids scenario there is 23 GW of micro-
generation and 24 GW of micro-CHP capacity on the system in 2050 out 
113 GW of total generation capacity (Ault et al., 2008a, p.xi). 
 
The LENS modelling highlights that scenarios other than one based on large 
scale passive electricity networks and central generation envisaged in the 
First Report of the Committee on Climate Change are plausible. A move to 
smaller scale local generation and supply companies would have significant 
implications for technology choices, for networks and for total energy 
demand (Pollitt, 2009). The modelling also reveals the potential for large 
differences in costs between scenarios, the dependency of the future on 
technological innovation and the high risk that policy will not deliver on its 
ambitious overall targets.  
 
Section 4: Policies towards renewables in the UK 
 
In this section we attempt an overview of UK renewables policy since the 
privatisation of the UK electricity supply industry beginning in 1990. 
Summarising UK policy is not a straightforward task because of the large 
range of government initiatives towards renewable energy and the large 
number of policy changes that have been announced in recent years, some of 
which have yet to be implemented fully.22 Discovering the exact cost of 
renewable energy support is not easy, as evidenced by the fact that the best 
sources of information are answers to parliamentary questions rather than 
published annual statistics. This is particularly true of the expenditure on 
individual technologies. We are grateful to the heroic efforts of Mitchell and 
Connor (2004) who reviewed UK renewable policy from 1990-2003 and 
provide the inspiration for some of our presentation. 
 
In broad outline there have been two main support mechanisms for 
renewable electricity and heat generation since privatisation in the UK: the 
Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) which ran from 1990-2002 and the 
Renewables Obligation Certificate (RO or ROC) Scheme which began in 
                                                 
22 NAO (2008, p.17) reports 20 government policies, strategies and reviews on energy 
between 1997 and 2009, with 16 of those from 2003 onwards. 
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2002. Both of these schemes have, during their period of operation, been the 
most significant form of renewable energy support in the UK and have been 
designed to work in parallel with liberalised electricity and gas markets. 
 
The assessment of renewable support policies is complicated because there 
are two obvious metrics of success: the amount of renewables realised 
relative to potential (quantity) and the total cost of renewable support policy 
relative to the amount of generation actually supported (suitably discounted) 
(cost). These two trade-off, meaning that success in one is likely to be 
associated with less success in the other. 
 
4.1: NFFO 
 
NFFO was originally designed as a way financing the extra costs of nuclear 
power which became clear in the run up to privatisation. A Non-Fossil Fuel 
Levy was introduced on final electricity prices to pay for nuclear de-
commissioning liabilities and electricity suppliers were forced to buy nuclear 
power at higher than market prices in auctions for non-fossil fuel power run 
by the Non Fossil Purchasing Agency (NFPA).23 In order to avoid this being 
seen as a discriminatory subsidy to the nuclear industry, it was recast as a 
way of supporting non-fossil fuel generation more generally and a portion 
was allocated to support renewable energy (Mitchell and Connor, 2004). The 
portion was small but it provided a relatively significant amount of money to 
the industry at a time when government expenditure on new technologies 
was falling to a very low level (and the Department of Energy was closing). 
The money was allocated to new renewable projects via a series of bidding 
rounds whereby renewable energy projects bid for an RPI-indexed per KWh 
price for initially 8 and later 15 years. Winning bids were selected by cost 
within each technology category.  
 
The result was a significant amount of bids in each of the auction rounds and 
falling bid costs in each successive round.24 Connor (2003, p.76) reports that 
                                                 
23 Initially the levy was 10.6% in England and Wales and fell to 0.9% in 1998 when 
payments for nuclear power ended. It was phased out in April 2002, having been 0.3%. 
The levy rate in Scotland – which was not used to fund nuclear liabilities - began at 0.5% 
in 1996 and reached a maximum of 1.2%. Source: Wikipedia entry on ‘Fossil Fuel Levy’. 
24 There were five rounds of NFFO in England and Wales: NFFO-1, start date 1990; 
NFFO-2, -3, -4 and -5 in 1992, 1995, 1997, 1998. In Scotland there were three rounds:  
SRO-1, -2 and -3 in 1995, 1997 and 1999. In Northern Ireland there were two rounds: NI-
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in the five rounds of NFFO in England and Wales, onshore wind costs fell 
from 10p/KWh in 1990 to 2.88p/KWh in 1998, with substantial falls for the 
other technology bands. While NFFO was successful in soliciting a large 
number of competitive bids and in ensuring that any funded projects were 
cost effective for electricity customers, it failed rather spectacularly in one 
key respect: delivery of actual investment by the winning bidders.  
 
Across the UK, between 1990 and 1999, out of 302 awarded wind projects 
covering 2659 MW only 75 projects were built rated at 391 MW (Wong, 
2005). Spectacularly, none out of NFFO-5’s 33 awarded wind projects was 
ever contracted. By contrast out of 308 landfill gas projects awarded, 208 
were operational in 2008 with 458 MW of capacity out of 660 MW 
contracted. For all the rounds of NFFO out of 933 awarded contracts 477 
were built, representing 1202 MW out of 3639 MW. 25 The primary cause 
for the failure was that bidders were over-optimistic in their estimates of the 
actual delivery cost of the project, often because the nature of the least cost 
auction – with no assessment of likelihood of delivery - incentivised 
minimisation of expenditure on preparing realistic bids (Mitchell and 
Connor, 2004). 
 
In reviewing the failure of the NFFO policy it is important to remember the 
context in which it operated. NFFO occurred in a context of renewables 
being a very low priority for UK government policy and during a period of a 
rapid switch from coal to gas fired power. Prices and pollution (in terms of 
quantities of CO2, SOX and NOX) fell substantially. The focus on market 
driven investments was good for energy and carbon efficient CHP 
investment in the industrial and commercial sectors (Marshall, 1993, 
Harvey, 1994 and Bonilla, 2006), which had struggled prior to privatisation 
(Jarvis, 1986). UK privatisation was a significant policy success in economic 
terms, and especially when the benefits to the environment are considered 
(Newbery and Pollitt, 1997).   
 
The privatisation and market liberalisation policies ensured that the UK 
would easily meet its Kyoto targets for 2012 without any further action 
(which was not the case for other leading European countries). The mood at 
the time is nicely summarised by a government minister for energy in 1988 
                                                                                                                                                 
NFFO-1 and -2 in 1994 and 1995. See Wong (2005, p.131). The last NFFO contract is 
due to expire in 2018. 
25 Source: DUKES (2009, Table 7.1.2). 
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who wrote that ‘privatisation of the electricity supply industry should boost 
the commercial prospects for these [green] technologies as a free market is 
established’26. Indeed Friends of the Earth were optimistic that the opening 
up of the domestic energy market to competition in 1998-99 would give rise 
to demand for ‘green’ tariffs and stimulate the production of green energy 
(Stanford, 1998). It was only as the EU moved towards substantial targets 
for renewables that it became clear that the UK needed a policy which 
delivered large quantities of renewables.27 However there are significant 
lessons to be learned from the NFFO experience. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly there is surprisingly little quantitative analysis of the 
bids that were successful under NFFO and the factors in their success and 
failure. Elliott (1992, p.267) criticised the NFFO scheme as a ‘somewhat 
half-hearted hybrid market/interventionist system’ that ‘would still leave 
short-term price and market factors to shape important long term strategic 
choice concerning patterns of technological development.’ Institutional 
barriers emerged early on as a critical factor in successful project 
implementation (McGowan, 1991).  
 
In particular, it became clear that there was a problem with the success rate 
of projects in gaining the necessary consents required to commence building 
(known as ‘planning permission’ in the UK) and that there was a lack of 
attention to proper environmental impact assessments (Coles and Taylor, 
1993). It was noted that in the early years less than half of all councils had 
planning guidance for renewable energy projects and that more importantly 
there was a lack of learning between councils (Hull, 1995). There were calls 
for clearer guidelines for the planning process to facilitate wind power 
(Roberts and Weightman, 1994). Early industry views of the scheme were 
positive, recognising that it did constitute a significant increase in 
expenditure on previous levels (Porter and Steen, 1996). However the 
successive rounds of auctions were thought not to provide assurance of 
continuity of support for renewables generally (Elliott, 1994, Mitchell, 1995) 
and there were worries that while they supported near market technologies, 
declines in R+D expenditure were bad for less advanced technologies like 
marine (Elliott, 1994). 
                                                 
26 Michael Spicer quoted in Elliott (1992, p.266). 
27 Under the 2001 EU Renewables Directive the UK signed up to 10% target for 
renewable electricity generation which is embodied within the successor scheme to 
NFFO (European Commission, 2001). 
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The final years of NFFO (1999-2001) coincided with a sharp decline in 
wholesale electricity prices as significant amounts of new gas fired capacity 
came into the market and there was increased competition within the initially 
duopolistic generation sector (Evans and Green, 2003). NFFO bidders had 
clearly been over optimistic in their bidding and their situation was 
exacerbated by the end of the compulsory wholesale power pool in March 
2001.  This had guaranteed the pool price to all generators. It was replaced 
with a contract market and a balancing market. Intermittent renewable 
generators relied on the balancing market and this market delivered much 
more volatile prices than the pool and was further complicated by having a 
system buy price and a system sell price which frequently diverged with buy 
prices much higher than sell prices with significant negative consequences 
for wind generators. This is because such buy-sell price divergence creates a 
penalty for imbalance between supply and demand for a generator. Over-
supply or over-demand result in an imbalance payment. As wind generators 
have less capacity to match supply and demand (due to the exogenous effect 
of weather) relative to fossil fuel generators who can adjust their spinning 
reserve. Of course this is not necessarily inefficient, as generators should be 
incentivised to solve the imbalance problem. The impact of this effect seems 
to have subsided after one year of operation of the new arrangements, partly 
due to the arrival of a more generous subsidy regime when Ofgem found 
little evidence of negative impact from the change to the trading system on 
renewable generators.28 
 
4.2: The ROC Scheme 
 
The Renewables Obligation Certificate Scheme which replaced NFFO in 
2002 is a form of tradeable green certificate (TGC). Under the scheme the 
government has set a minimum share of electricity to be acquired by 
electricity suppliers from specified renewable sources. This share is steadily 
increasing from 2002 to 2015, see Table 5. Under the ROC scheme 
electricity suppliers must acquire ROCs in the prescribed target share of 
renewable generation for each annual period. They can do this by buying or 
earning ROCs. ROCs are created when specified renewable generators 
generate electricity. Essentially this splits the market into two, a renewable 
                                                 
28 See Ofgem (2002). 
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part and a non-renewable part, with renewable generators getting a price for 
the ROCs they create plus the wholesale price of power.29  
 
However the UK scheme has two important features introduced at its 
inception. First, there is a buyout price (i.e. a penalty price) for ROCs should 
there not be enough ROCs created by renewable generation. This price is 
specified for each trading period and effectively caps the price creators of 
ROCs can receive. Second, there is recycling of the revenue collected from 
the buyout sales of ROCs. This takes the form of allocating the revenue back 
to the creators of ROCs in proportion to the number of ROCs they created.  
 
The renewable energy industry was very positive about the new incentive 
mechanism (Hill and Hay, 2004). So they should have been, because the 
scheme is very generous. Thus for example in 2007-08 the buyout (penalty) 
price was £34.30/MWh and only 64% of the required ROCs were created by 
generators meaning the buyout price bound in the certificate market. The 
total payment by suppliers was the target quantity of renewables multiplied 
by £34.30 / MWh. This meant 36% of the total ROC payment made by 
suppliers was available to be recycled and was divided proportionally among 
the generators who created actual ROCs. Accordingly the renewable 
generators received £34.30 plus £18.65 (i.e. an additional 36/64 times 
£34.30) for each ROC actually presented. This sum is in addition to the 
wholesale cost of power. As the total cost to suppliers of the ROC scheme 
was £876m, this implies that consumers overpaid by the value of the buyout 
revenue - £316m (36% of £876m, or over 1% of total electricity expenditure 
of £30.7bn in 2008)30. Interestingly the government collects the associated 
ROC payments on the generation contracted under NFFO, via the NFFO 
fund, which creates a surplus above the payments to generators under NFFO 
(this surplus is estimated to be around £200m per year).31 
 
It is also worth noting that renewable generators also receive the benefit of 
avoiding the cost of having to redeem CO2 permits in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme. The requirement that fossil fuel generators must present 
                                                 
29 Continuing NFFO contracts are funded via the revenue from the auction of ROCs (by 
the NFPA) associated with the contracts (see Ofgem, 2004). 
30 Source: DUKES Expenditure on energy by final user to 2008 (DUKES 1.1.6), 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/source/prices/prices.aspx. Accessed 25 
August 2009. 
31 See Oliver Tickell, ‘Robbing us of Renewables’ The Guardian,6th September 2008. 
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such permits further increases the implicit price support for renewable 
generation over conventional fossil fuel generation. 
 
Table 5: ROC targets and delivery against targets 
 Target 
renewable 
share in 
GB32 
% 
Delivery in 
UK 
Nominal 
Buyout Price
£/MWh 
Total Cost 
£m 
2002-03 3.0 59% 30.00 282.0
2003-04 4.3 56% 30.51 415.8 
2004-05 4.9 69% 31.59 497.9 
2005-06 5.5 76% 32.33 583.0
2006-07 6.7 68% 33.24 719.0 
2007-08 7.9 64% 34.30 876.4 
2008-09 9.1 35.36 1036.2
2009-10 9.7  37.19  
2010-11 10.4  + inflation 
thereafter 
 
2011-12 11.4    
2012-13 12.4    
2013-14 13.4  
2014-15 14.4  
2015-16 15.4   Estimated: 
~1753m 
(2008-09 prices) 
assuming no 
demand growth
Note: From 2016, the share is fixed at 15.4% until 2027. 
ROC scheme cost is total cost including revenue recycling. 
Source: www.opsi.gov.uk and Renewable Obligation Certificate Annual 
Reports from Ofgem. 
 
The ROC scheme is curious for two reasons. First, it relies on under delivery 
to trigger the maximum subsidy amount. If the target number (or more) 
ROCs were presented then the price would drop to zero. Second, if there is 
any under-delivery the maximum amount of subsidy is paid to those actually 
                                                 
32 Target share lower in Northern Ireland, but NI ROCs are tradable throughout UK. 
There is also a nominal distinction between Scottish ROCs (SROCs) and English and 
Welsh ROCs (ROCs) but these are tradable and both are included in the GB target share. 
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creating ROCs. Thus the scheme assumes failure to meet the target and 
ensures that a fixed total subsidy is paid, given this, regardless of how few 
ROCs are created. 
 
The scheme is further complicated by the introduction of banding from 1 
April 2009. This changes the exchange rate to ROCs of some renewable 
generation: established technologies will get less than 1 ROC per MWh, 
newer more. This change breaks the link between the total number of ROCs 
and the share of renewable energy generation and will presumably result in a 
reduced amount of electricity being produced from renewables if the scheme 
were fully successful (if the share of high exchange rate technologies were 
to take off, as it might with offshore wind). 
 
The Carbon Trust (2006) recommended a move to banding to recognise the 
different stages of development that the technologies were at and hence the 
higher learning benefits associated with increased funding to earlier stage 
technologies. Oxera (2005) point out the cost implications of allowing 
NFFO plant to earn ROCs once their NFFO contracts expired (around 
£620m) giving those projects unexpected additional subsidy. Oxera 
calculated that as much as half the payment via ROCs was in excess of that 
required to ensure that the funded projects went ahead, and that existing 
landfill gas projects did not require any ROCs to be economically viable. 
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Table 6: Banding of ROCs from 1 April 2009 
 
Generation type ROCs per MegaWatt hour 
Landfill Gas 0.25 
Sewage gas 0.5 Co-firing of biomass 
Onshore wind 
1 
Hydro 
Co-firing of energy crops 
Energy from waste with CHP 
Co-firing of biomass with CHP  
Geopressure 
Standard gasification 
Standard pyrolysis 
Offshore wind 
1.5 Biomass 
Co-firing of energy crops with CHP 
Wave 
2 
Tidal stream 
Advanced gasification 
Advanced pyrolysis 
Anaerobic digestion 
Energy crops 
Biomass with CHP 
Energy crops with CHP 
Solar photovoltaic 
Geothermal 
Tidal impoundment – tidal barrage 
Tidal impoundment – tidal lagoon 
 
Source: http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/pn037/pn037.aspx Accessed 25 
August 2009. 
 
This implies that the subsidy to offshore wind could be increased by 
£26.47/MWh (50% of the 2007-08 ROC revenue) and to tidal by 
£52.95/MWh (100% of the 2007-08 ROC revenue). In the 2009 budget 
offshore wind was subject to an emergency re-banding provision which saw 
offshore wind ROC band go to 2 for 2009-10 and 1.75 for 2010-11. 
 
 
4.3: Financial commitments and delivery under NFFO and the ROC 
 
Table 7 summarises the financial commitments made under the NFFO and 
ROC schemes, as well as a reference amount for the amount of public R+D 
expenditure reported to the IEA. The increased significance of the ROC 
scheme is evident. 
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Table 7: Financial support for renewables in the UK (nominal) 
 
 
Sources: 
** UK government renewable R&D budget data from IEA 
renewable R&D database, 
http://wds.iea.org/WDS/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx;
Mitchell and Connor (2004, p.1943). 
Note: RO does include revenue recycling. 
 
 
While the ROC scheme is the most significant element of the UK’s 
expenditure on renewables it is not the only element. Table 8 is a summary 
offered in a ministerial answer to a Parliamentary Select Committee 
question. It is noteworthy that there are still significant additional amounts 
being spent by the taxpayer on supporting earlier stage technologies outside 
the CO2 price and RO support mechanisms. However the order of 
magnitude of energy customer support for renewables is of the order of 
£1.8bn in 2008, in addition to £400m by the taxpayer. This level of support 
is up 47% in real terms from the figure estimated by Wordsworth and Grubb 
£m
**R&D RO NFFO
1990-1991 14.7 6.1
1991-1992 17.1 11.7
1992-1993 16.1 28.9
1993-1994 15.2 68.1
1994-1995 9.1 96.4
1995-1996 9.1 94.5
1996-1997 6.2 112.8
1997-1998 4.3 126.5
1998-1999 3.3 127.0
1999-2000 4.6 56.4
2000-2001 4.4 64.9
2001-2002 6.1 54.7
2002-2003 10.5 282.0 -
2003-2004 11.6 415.8 -
2004-2005 19.7 497.9 -
2005-2007 36.6 583.0 -
2006-2007 49.5 719.0 -
2007-2008 41.6 876.4 -
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(2003) of £1.3bn in 2002-0333. Table A1, at the end of the paper, gives a 
more detailed breakdown of renewable funding over the 2005-2008 period. 
Some of the expenditure reported here may overlap since it is collected from 
a number of sources: but it indicates significant direct funding for PV, 
marine, offshore wind and biomass outside the main ROC scheme. 
 
As will be clear from the above discussion of the progress with the RO 
scheme, the development of electricity from renewables has been 
disappointing in terms of overall cost relative to delivery given the UK’s 
resource potential and its ambitious targets. Table 9 gives the figures in 
terms of total electricity generation. A number of features stand out. First of 
all, electricity from biomass is currently larger than that from wind. Hydro 
remains significant within the UK renewable portfolio. Connor (2003) 
reported estimates from 2002, which suggested that UK would only meet 2/3 
of its target level by 2010. This still seems likely. However the striking thing 
about the 2002 estimates is that for biomass, offshore wind and hydro they 
seem likely to be met or exceeded, while being let down by onshore wind. 
The UK is failing to meet its projections for renewables as predicted but this 
is largely due to the failure to deliver the long expected increase in 
generation from onshore wind.  
 
Both NFFO and RO have stimulated electricity from landfill gas and co-
firing of biomass and municipal waste (with fossil fuels). These technologies 
were near market in the early 1990s and had good prospects at that time. 
Brown and Maunder (1994) discussed the UK’s potential for exploiting 
landfill gas and Jamasb, Kaimal et al. (2008) discuss the prospects for waste 
to energy, noting there is significant further potential, especially if CHP is 
involved. The use of biomass for co-firing in coal fired plants continues to 
be one of the most sensible uses of biomass, as it is well proven that mixes 
of up to 10% biomass require little adjustment to existing plant (Thornley, 
2006). Small hydro projects have also had some success with a steady 
increase in hydro generation from these schemes. These projects use 
established technology and have benefited from market based support 
mechanisms. Paish (2002) highlights around 400 MW of further potential for 
small scale hydro in the UK. 
 
                                                 
33 UK inflation between September 2002 and September 2008 was 15%. Source: ONS, 
CPI series. www.ons.gov.uk, Accessed 27 August, 2009. The National Audit Office only 
reported a figure of £700m p.a. for annual costs 2003-2006 (NAO, 2005, p.35). 
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Table 8: Support for renewable energy in 2007-09 
Scheme Description Cost  Paid by 
Renewables 
Obligation 
Electricity suppliers must buy a 
proportion of their sales from 
renewable generators, or pay a buy-
out charge  
£874 million in 
2007/8 a  
Electricity 
consumers 
EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme  
Renewable generators indirectly 
benefit from the increase in 
electricity prices as other companies 
pass the cost of emissions permits 
into the price of power  
Perhaps £300 
million in 2008, 
given current permit 
prices b  
Electricity 
consumers 
Carbon Emissions 
Reduction Target  
Energy companies must install low-
carbon items in homes, which could 
include microgeneration from 2008  
Total cost will be 
£1.5 billion over 3 
years—most spent 
on energy 
efficiency  
Gas and 
electricity 
consumers  
Renewable 
Transport Fuel 
Obligation  
Fuel suppliers must supply a 
proportion of biofuels or pay a buy-
out charge  
No more than £200 
million in 2008/9 c  
Consumers 
Climate Change 
Levy 
Electricity suppliers need not pay 
this tax (passed on to non-domestic 
consumers) on electricity from 
renewable generators  
£68 million to UK 
generators;  
£30 million to 
generators abroad in 
2007/8  
Taxpayers, via 
reduced 
revenues  
Lower fuel duty 
for biofuels  
The rate of fuel duty is 20 pence per 
litre below that for petrol and diesel 
£100 million in 
2007  
Taxpayers, via 
reduced 
revenues  
Environmental 
Transformation 
Fund  
Grants for technology development 
and deployment, including subsidies 
for installing renewable generation, 
planting energy crops and 
developing biomass infrastructure.  
£400 million over 
three years from 
2008/9  
Taxpayers 
Research 
Councils 
Grants for basic science research  £30 million in 
2007/8  
Taxpayers 
Energy 
Technologies 
Institute  
Grants to accelerate development 
(after the basic science is known) of 
renewables and other energy 
technologies  
Allocation (and 
eventual size) of 
budget not yet 
announced.  
Taxpayers and 
sponsoring 
companies  
 
Source:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeconaf
/195/19509.htm#a53 Accessed 28 August, 2009. 
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It is also the case that there are promising developments with offshore wind 
in the UK (assuming the actual delivered costs can be kept down). As of 
August 2009, offshore wind capacity is currently 598 MW, but 1246 MW is 
under construction, and a further 3613 MW has been consented. This 
contrasts with 3730 MW of onshore wind capacity, with only 930 MW 
under construction, and 3275MW consented.34 It seems likely given the 
continuance of high levels of support via banded ROCs that offshore wind 
will overtake onshore wind generation, albeit on the back of very 
disappointing delivery of onshore wind projects. 
 
Looking at the success of the NFFO and RO schemes. NFFO did well on 
cost of the policy, but less well on quantity of renewables delivered. RO did 
better on quantity delivered but much less well on cost of the policy. 
 
4.4: Other Renewables Policies 
 
While the main support mechanisms have favoured wind and biomass, direct 
government funding, as detailed in Table A1, has also helped the marine 
industry. A resurgence in research and demonstration funding in the last 10 
years has resulted in some positive developments (see Mueller and Wallace, 
2008). The first 1.2 MW is tidal stream plant was installed in 2008 (Riddell, 
2008) and the industry well placed internationally to exploit this and related 
marine technologies (Elliot, 2009).  The UK government is currently 
conducting another feasibility study of the 8.5GW Severn Barrage (which 
could generate 5% of the UK’s current electricity demand). This is the 
biggest of the UK’s potential tidal projects (Conway, 1986), but cost and 
environmental issues remain to be addressed (see DECC, 2009a). However 
it would seem sensible to trial a smaller scheme first (such as a barrage 
across the Mersey), in order for learning that might benefit the much larger 
Severn scheme. A large barrage project could almost certainly not be 
accommodated within the existing ROC scheme. 
                                                 
34 Source: www.bwea.com. Accessed 17th December, 2009. 
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Table 9: Renewable Electricity Generation in the UK 1990-2008 (Source: DUKES, various issues) 
 
 
 
  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Generation(GWh)            
Wind             
 Onshore wind 9 391 945 960 1251 1276 1736 2501 3574 4491 5792 
 Offshore wind 0 0 1 5 5 10 199 403 651 783 1305 
Solar photovolatics 0 0 1 2 3 3 4 8 11 14 17 
Hydro:             
 Small scale 91 166 214 210 204 150 283 444 478 534 568 
 Large scale 5080 4672 4871 3845 4584 2987 4561 4478 4115 4554 4600 
Biofuels:             
 Landfill gas 139 560 2188 2507 2679 3276 4004 4290 4424 4677 4757 
 Sewage sludge digestion 316 367 367 363 368 394 440 470 456 496 564 
 Municipal solid waste combustion 221 747 840 880 907 965 971 964 1083 1177 1226 
 Co-firing with fossil fuels     286 602 1022 2533 2528 1956 1613 
 Biomass 0 334 410 743 807 947 927 850 797 964 1155 
Total Biofules and wastes 676 2008 3796 4493 5047 6174 7364 9107 9288 9270 9315 
Total  Renewables 5857 7237 9828 9516 11093 10600 14147 16940 18136 19646 21597 
Total Generation 319701 334042 377069 384778 387506 398209 393867 398313 398823 397044 389649 
             
%             
Total  Renewables 1.83% 2.17% 2.61% 2.47% 2.86% 2.66% 3.59% 4.25% 4.55% 4.95% 5.54% 
of which Wind 0.00% 0.12% 0.25% 0.25% 0.32% 0.32% 0.49% 0.73% 1.06% 1.33% 1.82% 
 Hydro 1.62% 1.45% 1.35% 1.05% 1.24% 0.79% 1.23% 1.24% 1.15% 1.28% 1.33% 
 Biofuels 0.21% 0.60% 1.01% 1.17% 1.30% 1.55% 1.87% 2.29% 2.33% 2.33% 2.39% 
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PV has relied on direct government support for installation programmes 
which have only involved a small number of installations, mainly funded via 
the DTI/BERR, under the Low Carbon Buildings Fund. This funding has 
only installed a few hundred PV systems. The degree of satisfaction with the 
technology among the recipients of funding has been positive (Faiers and 
Neame, 2006), but a lack of significant sums of money and proper 
assessment of the learning from the policy has been noted (Keirstead, 2007). 
This is in spite of a well regarded R&D plan for solar being put in place in 
the 1990s (Stainforth et al., 1996) and work showing that significant 
community installations of solar would not pose any local grid problems 
(Thomson and Infield, 2007). 
 
The government has made two announcements of changes to its renewables 
policy, which are due to be implemented in the future, which are relevant to 
any assessment of the need for reform of the current arrangements. Both of 
these policies are allowed for in primary legislation (Energy Act, 2008)35 
and are currently being consulted on as to their exact form. 
 
First, there is due to be a Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) for small scale low carbon 
generation.36 FITs guarantee fixed per kWh prices for renewable generation 
and can be differentiated by technology type. This will be for renewable 
electricity generation up to 5 MW and fossil fuel CHP up to 50 kW. This is 
to encourage PV, small scale wind (including micro wind), micro-hydro and 
micro-CHP. It aims to ‘remove uncertainty for investors, reduce payback 
periods and increase returns on investment’. It specifically aims to ‘engage 
communities, businesses and domestic households in the fight against 
climate change’. This policy is due to be in place in April 2010. This policy 
responds to industry concerns about the lack of ambition in micro-generation 
policy (Lupton, 2008). 
 
Second, there is due to be a Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI).37 This has the 
potential to be a significant policy covering all scales of production: 
household, community and industrial. It is intended to drive the share of 
renewable heat to 14% (though this is not a firm target) up from 0.6%. It 
                                                 
35 See http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/ukpga_20080032_en_1 Accessed 28 August 
2009. 
36 See BIS website on Feed-in-Tariffs. www.bis.gov.uk Accessed 20 August 2009. 
37 See BIS website on Renewable Heat Incentive. www.bis.gov.uk Accessed 20 August 
2009. 
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could cover ‘biomass, solar hot water, air and ground source heat pumps, 
biomass CHP, biogas from anaerobic digestion and bio-methane injected 
into the gas grid’. It may also involve support payments to households. It 
will be funded by a levy on fossil fuel suppliers of heat, certainly gas 
suppliers, but potentially suppliers of coal and heating oil and LPG. This 
policy could address a major imbalance in the current energy tax regime the 
under-taxation of gas for heating. 
 
4.5: An Assessment of Renewables Policies 
 
A 20 year view of UK renewables policy suggests a failure to translate a 
country’s early resource based promise into actual delivery of renewable 
energy. However it would be wrong to suggest widespread policy failure. 
The UK is making progress on decarbonisation and has strong and 
increasingly comprehensive policies in place, covering electricity, heat and 
transport (via policies towards electric vehicles and biofuels).  
 
Two points are worth making at this stage. First, renewable energy policy 
remains an expensive gamble for all countries. Second, it is unclear what 
part particular renewable technologies should play in decarbonisation to 
2050.  
 
As Helm (2002) has pointed out a sensibly high and stable price of carbon is 
the starting point for all economically literate decarbonisation policies. In the 
absence of this it is virtually impossible to establish proper signals for 
mature technologies and near market technologies whose response to the 
proper price signal determines how fast we need to accelerate less developed 
technologies. This is particularly true for nuclear, CCS and demand 
reduction investments, many of which are being delayed by low, volatile and 
uncertain prices for carbon. The UK with its diversified energy system, 
exposure to world energy markets and openness to both nuclear and CCS 
has keenly felt the lack of a proper carbon price signal. Without a proper 
carbon price it is unclear how much renewables are actually required and at 
what point it is sensible to stop directly subsidising their deployment (i.e. we 
won’t know when they have become mature technologies). 
 
As Nelson (2008) discusses, the failure to set a sufficiently tight cap on CO2 
at the EU level makes a nonsense of UK renewables policy as a policy for 
decarbonisation. More renewable electricity generation within the EUETS 
simply causes fuel switching in the fossil plant from gas to coal, not to 
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mention delaying non-renewable low carbon investments in CCS and 
nuclear. In this context UK renewables policy has been somewhat 
conservative with respect to funding levels under NFFO and with respect to 
renewable energy targets under the RO and, until recently, unwilling to pick 
winners.  
 
The UK’s willingness to back particular technologies may be increasing for 
other reasons, however. As Eikeland and Saeverud (2007) point out the 
ending of the UK’s status as an energy exporter in 2003 and the associated 
rapid decline in oil and gas reserves has been associated with a reawakening 
of energy security concern as a major driver of UK energy policy. It is likely 
to explain substantially increased interest in delivering more domestic 
renewable capacity. 
 
Failure to deliver large quantities of renewables so far is not a particular 
issue in terms of decarbonisation or in terms of minimising the long-term 
costs of renewable deployment. This is because delay will probably mean 
lower costs of exploitation when they are finally exploited (due to learning 
by doing elsewhere and learning by research). The really unfortunate aspect 
of the ROC system is its failure to cost effectively deliver the renewables 
that it has delivered. This has been a serious design flaw and the inability of 
the UK government to learn and correct the flaw does not bode well for any 
other long-term mechanism put in place to support renewables. However 
given the targets for delivery that exist within the scheme it is clearly 
important to consider why the scheme has not delivered the quantity of 
renewables intended. The failure of the scheme to deliver overall lies 
squarely with one particular technology: the failure to deliver sufficient 
quantities on onshore wind. We now examine this issue. 
 
4.6: Onshore Wind and the Planning Problem 
 
The standard reason given for the delivery failure is difficulties in getting 
new wind farms through local planning processes. While conventional 
power plants can easily be built on existing sites and require national level 
planning consents, wind farms are often small in terms of MW capacity and 
require local planning permission if less than 50 MW (this covers most 
onshore installations)38. There has been consistent evidence that gaining 
                                                 
38 There were only 8 operational schemes in May 2009 with capacity of 50 MW or more 
onshore (DUKES, 2009, pp.145-151). 
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planning permission is a serious obstacle to the development of wind farms 
or more precisely that the costs of obtaining permission are often prohibitive 
in terms of imposed delays, negotiation costs and planning restrictions on 
the precise nature of the final investment.  
 
In the UK local planning decisions typically involve an applicant, such as a 
wind project developer, making a planning application. This would involve 
the submission of detailed plans and an impact assessment to the relevant 
local government authority. This application would initially be assessed by a 
local planning officer. The officer would make recommendations on the 
plans to the relevant group of elected local councillors for the area, who 
would vote on the proposal. Plans would be available for public consultation 
and objections could be raised during the review period. Planning 
applications can be granted subject to conditions and obligations. This 
process might result in a number of iterations in the plans. Should 
permission be refused the applicant can appeal the decision in which case 
there would be a costly public enquiry. The relevant central government 
department also has the right to disallow a locally approved planning 
application (so objectors can appeal to the relevant government minister). At 
the national level plans need to be submitted to the relevant government 
department for referral to the Secretary of State for final decision. 
Objections can be raised to these plans according to the planning guidelines. 
This national level process is being streamlined, as below.39 
 
The average time for local and national planning decisions on onshore wind 
in 2007 was 24 months, with approval rates of 62%.40 For large projects the 
Ministry of Defence, National Air Traffic Control and civil airports were 
major objectors. Attempts have been made since 2007 to place obligations 
on local councils to set target levels of energy from renewables for new 
developments. The 2008 Planning Act41 allows for the setting up of an 
Infrastructure Planning Commission to decide on large onshore wind farms 
                                                 
39 For more detail on the planning process in England, see 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/uk_supply/energy_mix/renewable/
planning/plan_policy/england/england.aspx Accessed 20 October 2009. 
40 Source: BWEA (April-June 2008), Real Power, p.21, 
http://www.bwea.com/pdf/realpower/realpower_12.pdf. Accessed 28th August 2009. 
41 See http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/ukpga_20080029_en_1 Accessed 28 August 
2009. 
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(greater than 50 MW) as well as large offshore projects (greater than 100 
MW).42 
 
The literature has dug more deeply into the ‘planning problem’. Hedger 
(1995) highlights that wind power development involves a clash of planning 
cultures: land use vs. energy supply. The first is fundamentally local, 
participatory and concerned with preserving rural landscapes and the second 
fundamentally national, top-down and concerned with delivering 
technological solutions to national energy supply requirements. These 
cultures were bound to clash in onshore wind power development.  
 
Mitchell and Connor (2004) emphasise that the emphasis on cost 
minimisation, combined with the tying of subsidy to particular locations and 
plans meant that many successful NFFO bids failed to get through the 
planning process. This was because they were not able to invest in local 
engagement or indeed to respond to the outcome of the engagement process 
by modifying their proposals. Indeed the competitive nature of NFFO meant 
that often the bidders had to keep prospective locations secret and did not 
engage in local consultations prior to bidding. Toke (2005a) found that for 
the NFFO rounds 3, 4 and 5 projects that he examined: 47 schemes were 
granted planning permission, 47 refused planning permission and 96 did not 
make or complete an application.43  
 
The major reasons given for planning objections were visual amenity 
impairment and worries about noise (Eltham et al., 2008). These gave rise to 
concerns about economic effects on house prices and on tourism. The UK is 
a densely populated island, with many areas of lower population and high 
ground being located in national parks or areas attracting tourists and 
increasingly having large percentages of residents or second-home buyers 
moving there for visual amenity rather than employment reasons (see 
Strachan and Lal, 2004 for a discussion of the debate around tourism). The 
decline of employment in farming and rural industry has reduced the scope 
for arguments based on the small number of permanent jobs that might be 
created in the energy sector. This is because increasing percentages of 
                                                 
42 See NAO, 2008, pp.40-41 for a discussion. 
43 In this vein, Upreti and van der Horst (2004) have an enlightening discussion of one 
NFFO biomass project which because it could not be modified, as suggested by the local 
consultation process eventually had to be abandoned.  
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people living in the countryside work in nearby conurbations and are not 
looking for employment in local industry. 
 
Rural environmental protection charities and local community action groups 
thus had strong incentives to organise opposition to individual wind farm 
projects. This is in spite of the fact that in some cases tourism actually 
increased after wind turbines were installed and that the noise from a 
modern turbine that is 500 metres away is no more than in a quiet bedroom 
(Strachan and Lal, 2004, p.563). A number of studies have shown that 
attitudes to wind farms consistently improve after construction with many 
people’s fears not being realised (e.g.Warren et al., 2005 and Eltham et al., 
2008). It is also true that in general there is majority support for new wind 
farms but that there are a significant number of local and non-local objectors 
to given schemes (Warren et al., 2005).  This suggests that there is a ‘social 
gap’ or ‘democratic deficit’ at the local level which needs to be overcome 
(Bell et al., 2005) to connect national policy delivery with legitimate local 
concerns.  
Rather surprisingly, there has been little systematic study of success rates in 
individual local authority areas or by individual developers or indeed by 
ownership type. Only Toke (2005a) attempts a regression analysis, looking 
at planning permission acceptance and refusal for wind projects based on a 
sample of 51 proposals. He finds among other things that if local planning 
officers (who process applications and make recommendations to the local 
councillors who vote on the application) object then projects are almost 
always refused, while if they accept it is likely to go through on appeal and 
he also finds that if the Campaign to Protect Rural England which 
campaigns ‘for the beauty, tranquillity and diversity of the countryside’44 
objects, it is likely to be opposed by the local parish council.  One developer, 
Wind Prospect45 (which has a joint venture with EDF to develop onshore 
wind farms in the UK) has invested heavily in local consultation and does 
seem to have been more successful in gaining planning permission (see 
Toke, 2005a). There have also been examples of active community 
involvement leading to successful development, particularly where the 
community owns shares in the wind farm, but these are small in capacity 
                                                 
44 See http://www.cpre.org.uk/ Accessed 28th August, 2009. 
45 See http://www.windprospect.com/ Accessed 28th August, 2009. 
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terms.46 However both under NFFO and RO there has been an unwillingness 
to actively involve communities in co-ownership of onshore wind 
developments, possibly because of the dominance of large power companies 
in the UK within the wind power sector and the high transaction costs of 
such engagement. 
Overall, it is difficult to tell whether the full cost of developing wind power 
onshore is actually much higher than it would appear, given the social value 
of the countryside in the UK, or whether a feasible redistribution of the 
current benefits towards potential local objectors would be enough to solve 
the planning problem. Put another way, societal preferences have mattered 
for onshore wind and there has been a failure to encourage societal 
acceptance of new onshore wind investments.  
 
Bergmann et al. (2008) use willingness to pay modelling of a sample of rural 
and urban dwellers in Scotland. While both groups value reduced 
environmental impact from power generation highly, they find that urban 
dwellers are willing to pay more for an offshore wind farm than for an 
equivalent large onshore wind farm and value the rural employment 
opportunities less than rural people (suggesting that even those in urban 
areas are willing to pay extra for offshoring). The actual construction costs 
of wind farms in the UK are difficult to come by but the information that is 
available suggests that simulations of the likely penetration of new schemes 
are still based on optimistic assumptions that wind costs will be much 
cheaper than they currently are.47 High actual costs may therefore be a factor 
delaying investment.  It is also the case that the achieved load factors for the 
whole UK wind portfolio in 2008 were 27.0% for onshore and 30.4% for 
offshore48, in contrast to higher assumptions in some calculations (Dale et 
al., 2004, assume 35% for both onshore and offshore wind). 
 
No doubt smaller, more local developments would facilitate reduced 
planning objections but they would come with their own higher costs. The 
move to FITs for such smaller developments should help increase the 
number of these types of project. However in examining scenario rankings 
                                                 
46 One of the few examples of significant capital raising from the local community was 
the Baywind project in Cumbria, who first raised £1.2m to form a cooperative to develop 
wind power. See www.baywind.co.uk 
47 Compare actual costs in Synder and Kaiser 2009 and Blanco, 2009, with cost 
simulation assumptions in Dale et al., 2004 and Strbac, 2007. 
48 See: DUKES Table 7.4. at www.berr.gov.uk. Accessed 27 August 2009. 
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from different wind actors in Northwest England, Mander (2008) found that 
expansion of offshore wind was the only part of a wind strategy that both 
pro-wind and pro-countryside lobbies could agree on, even if onshore wind 
became more community driven. Attempts to streamline the planning 
process have been made with significant reforms to the Appeals process in 
2003 (Toke, 2003), giving more power at the national level, however there is 
clearly still an issue of getting permission. Attempts in 2005 to streamline 
the planning process in Wales (under a devolved administration) have had 
mixed success (Cowell, 2007). The Welsh Assembly designated ‘strategic 
search areas’ which were assessed to be more suitable for large wind farm 
developments (and hence more likely to be approved on appeal). These 
proved controversial with both pro and anti wind lobbies, with wind 
developers unhappy that many proposed schemes lay outside the ‘areas’ and 
anti-wind groups unhappy with where some of the boundaries of the 
acceptable ‘areas’ were drawn. 
 
 
4.7: Comments on biomass 
 
Biomass is likely to be the second largest renewable energy source out to 
2020 in the UK. Biomass is frequently cited as a significant but finite 
contribution to UK decarbonisation (of the order of up to 5%) (see Taylor, 
2008, for a review). Biomass policy towards waste has been largely 
successful due to the near market nature of the technology and its 
responsiveness to both NFFO and RO subsidies. The direct burning of bio-
crops has also been successful given the emerging global market in tradable 
biomass from countries such as Brazil, Canada and the US (Junginger et al., 
2008).  
 
However government support for local bio-crop plants has proved 
problematic given the technological, planning and economic constraints. 
A high profile project involving local biomass and new technology failed 
due to financing concerns (Piterou et al., 2008) and it is difficult to justify 
the use of local bio-crops for anything other than direct burning in existing 
power coal fired power stations in direct competition with internationally 
traded biomass, which is usually produced more efficiently abroad. However 
some focus group studies have suggested that there is public support for the 
use of local biomass in small CHP plants and scepticism about the overall 
GHG impact of the use of internationally traded biomass (see Upham et al., 
2007).  
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It is not environmentally sensible to use local bio-crops to produce bio-fuel 
in the UK. Local bio-crops produce more GHG impact when directly burnt 
to produce power and heat (Hammond et al., 2008). Indeed in the longer run 
the current use of bio-fuels to blend with petrol and diesel may be phased 
out as the vehicle fleet is electrified (for current use see Bomb et al., 2007). 
The difficulty of making a sensible industrial policy argument for a local 
crop-dedicated biomass power plant within a sensible long run 
decarbonisation strategy is helpfully discussed by van der Horst (2005).  
Indeed Slade et al. (2009) criticise UK bio-energy policy as being 
characterised by lots of initiatives but with a lack of clarity as to precise 
objectives to be delivered. If the UK were to rely on internationally traded 
biomass as its key input this would require better certification as to the 
source of the biomass (van Dam et al., 2008).  
 
What we can say is that bio-energy, with its complicated supply chain, 
displacement impacts and total production cycle sustainability impacts, 
requires proper pricing of all its environmental effects (including GHGs and 
local pollutants) in order to calculate whether it is worthwhile (Elghali et al., 
2007). The life cycle GHG impact of bio-crops is further complicated by the 
carbon storage impacts  of increasing the area set aside for growing bio-
crops (Cannell, 2003) (i.e. the impact on the amount of carbon stored in the 
stock of growing crops). 
 
Section 5: Comparing the Performance of the UK with that of other 
countries 
 
Our discussion so far indicates that comparative assessment of the UK’s 
policy on renewable energy would not be straightforward. It is clear that the 
UK has pursued a successful decarbonisation strategy to date and that there 
have been several areas of relative success in responding to both price 
signals and in developing new technologies for deployment in the UK. The 
one area of failure is in deployment of onshore wind at least cost. The net 
environmental impact of this failure on CO2, relative to the counterfactual of 
achieving its renewables target, is currently zero, given that the UK is on 
course to meet its GHG reduction targets. However this environmental 
performance could have been delivered at lower cost. The excess costs of the 
current set of policies is hard to estimate given the diversity of support 
instruments however a lower end estimate would be the amount of revenue 
recycling within the RO mechanism. This is because this overpayment was 
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clearly unnecessary to deliver the observed quantity of renewables on the 
system. This excess cost is significant and rising. However it remains small 
given the high cost of some other countries’ renewable deployment 
strategies which have not allowed them to meet their GHG reduction targets 
(e.g. Germany and Spain).  
 
It is fashionable to suggest that the root cause of the ‘problem’ of under 
delivery of onshore wind is the use of a TGC scheme rather than a FIT as 
used in Germany and Spain.49 However a more balanced assessment by the 
International Energy Agency (2006) of the UK’s renewable energy policy 
points out that TGCs have worked well in a number of jurisdictions, e.g. 
Texas, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand. It is only in the UK where they 
seem to have manifestly failed to deliver the intended capacity. 
 
There are two common theoretical arguments for the superiority of FITs 
over TGCs. First, that by offering a fixed price per kWh to developers this 
allows new renewables to be financed more easily. Second, that FITs attract 
large quantities of renewables because renewables are not limited to the 
most attractive sites.  
 
The first argument is well put by Mitchell et al. (2006) who argue that the 
UK ROC scheme exposes renewables to price, volume and balancing risks, 
rather than just volume risks as under a FIT. While this clearly does impose 
costs, it is not clear that it is suboptimal or that it explains non-delivery 
against the UK’s renewables targets. Higher risk is relevant to non-delivery 
where development is small scale and the developers have little or no credit 
history, here there may well be a significant market failure in the market for 
external finance. However it is rather a weak argument when the ultimate 
developers are mostly large multinational companies making portfolio 
investments (and when most ROC credits are bought by the 6 multinational 
supply companies who dominate the UK market, each with generation 
interests and the option invest directly in renewable capacity).  
 
The second argument makes less theoretical sense because it is not clear 
why developing the most attractive sites first is not desirable in any case. 
The quantity of renewable forthcoming is clearly accelerated by offering 
initially high returns, but offering a margin for renewables to attract 
                                                 
49 See for example: Jacobsson et al., 2009, Toke and Lauber, 2007, Meyer, 2003, Lipp, 
2007, Toke, 2005b, Butler and Neuhoff, 2008. 
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investors is not a function of whether the subsidy regime is a FIT or TGC 
but of how big a quantity of renewables is required under either scheme. 
TGCs can set ambitious targets as in the UK and can deliver attractive 
prices.50 Low prices for renewables are not a problem with the UK’s 
ambitious ROC targets51. 
 
In the end the question becomes would the UK have delivered more onshore 
wind capacity had there been a FIT for wind energy? For community 
schemes the answer is quite possibly, because the uncertainty of individual 
project cash flows may well have been an issue for funders. However, for 
larger schemes largely owned by multinational energy companies, it is hard 
to say. The problem has clearly been related to planning permission and it is 
not obvious how changing the funding regime improves the prospects for 
gaining planning permission unless it is more generous and offers scope for 
offering attractive payments to the local community.  
 
The literature seems to suggest two more fundamental dimensions are of 
interest to explaining the difference in delivery of onshore wind between the 
UK, Germany, Spain and Denmark: land use constraints and local 
involvement in ownership (e.g. via local co-operatives or farmers) . 
 
                                                 
50 See for example the performance of the Swedish scheme (Swedish Energy Agency, 
2008). 
51 UK renewable generators currently (December, 2009) receive around 9.7p/KWh (ROC 
price + wholesale price). The German FIT for wind is 9.2 Euro cent per KWh in the first 
year, declining over time. Thus UK renewable generators receive more than in Germany. 
However adjusting for the quality of wind resource in the UK - which would increase the 
return on capital in the UK relative to Germany for a given unit energy price - the 
profitability gap is even larger than it appears (Butler and Neuhoff, 2008).  
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Table 10: Differences between leading wind countries in Europe 
 
 1000 sq 
miles 
Land /per 
million 
population 
2008/9 
% Onshore 
Wind owned by 
utilities/ 
corporates 
% Owned 
by 
Farmers 
% Owned 
by 
Cooperatives 
Wind 
capacity 
MW 
end 
2008 
UK 1.5 98 1 0.5 3288
Germany 1.7 55 35 10 23903 
Spain 4.3 99+ <0.5 0 16740 
Denmark 2.9 12 63 25 3160
 
Sources: Wikipedia for land densities; www.thewindpower.net/23-countries-
capacities,php; Toke (2005b). 
 
In Denmark local ownership is very high and it is also notable in Germany 
as a determinant of successful strategic deployment in these countries (Toke, 
2007, Szarka and Bluhdorn, 2006). This is important because these two 
countries face similar if not identical land use constraints to the UK. The 
development in Spain however has occurred with similar ownership of wind 
assets (i.e. multinational companies) but in context of very little land use 
constraint (Toke and Strachan, 2006) relative to the UK. Thus it seems clear 
that none of these ‘comparator’ countries has similar institutional and 
physical starting points to the UK. 
 
Econometric modelling by Soderholm and Klassen (2007) of diffusion rates 
of wind power across Europe confirms that the UK has lower diffusion 
(penetration) relative to other countries and that FITs do tend to be more 
successful in encouraging diffusion, but that a given FIT would likely have 
less of an impact in the UK than in Germany (e.g. due to lower levels of 
supporting public R&D expenditure). 
 
What is clear is that the financial cost of wind power delivered on shore is 
unnecessarily high in the UK. Butler and Neuhoff (2008, p.1856) show that 
while the NFFO schemes did result in much lower support prices for wind 
than in the UK, they were not that much lower once adjusted for the quality 
of underlying wind resource. Under the RO renewable support costs are 
estimated to be twice as high in 2006 as they would be under a German 
support tariff applied to the UK’s wind resource (which would be lower than 
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the actual tariff in Germany). While Toke (2005b) shows that the ROC 
scheme with revenue recycling was more expensive per kWh than the 
Germany FIT following reductions in the size of the FIT in Germany. 
 
Looking at Spain where large utilities have dominated in ownership of wind 
generation in a similar way to the UK, Stenzel and Frenzel (2008) highlight 
the positive reaction of incumbent Spanish companies to wind power 
development in Spain in contrast with that in Germany. They highlight the 
importance of corporate self-interest in promoting wind power development. 
Wind power in Germany developed in spite of opposition from Germany 
utilities who were forced to accommodate renewables and bear the costs of 
connection to the grid. In Spain this has led the corporate generators to 
support investment in better prediction of wind speeds at individual wind 
farm sites in order to better manage the grid. However in Germany there 
have been significant costs imposed on the transmission system, which are 
not reflected in the connection incentives of wind developers. This has led to 
grid management issues in Germany, which will become more costly to deal 
with as wind capacity increases (Klessman et al., 2008). It is even possible 
to suggest that the continuation of the grip of incumbents on the German 
power market is in significant part down to the unwillingness of the German 
government to liberalise the market fully for fear of undermining the ability 
of the incumbents to finance the significant reinforcement costs associated 
with renewables expansion. 
 
In the UK, there were around 13.2 GW, in 195 projects in 2008, which are in 
the ‘GB queue’52. These are projects which wish to connect to the power 
grid, but for whom currently no firm connection right can be offered (unlike 
under the German FIT, where renewables capacity must be connected and 
paid for generated power)53. It is suggested by the UK government that this 
is one of the barriers to the roll out of renewables (DECC, 2009c). This may 
explain some of the slow delivery of renewable wind connection in the UK, 
but it certainly does not explain the most significant part of it. It is 
impossible to tell how economically viable much of the Queue is, and 
Ofgem has identified only around 450 MW of wind capacity that needs to be 
                                                 
52 See 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/Trans/PriceControls/TPCR4/ConsultantsRep
orts/Documents1/16962-The%20GB%20Queue%20-
%20%20Reasons%20and%20remedies.ppt Accessed 28 August 2009. 
53 See Swider et al. (2008). 
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prioritised via accelerating transmission investment.54 It is also the case that 
new renewable connection should face the true costs of connection to the 
grid and capacity and should come on stream when it is at least system cost, 
rather than only least generation cost. Nodal pricing would seem to be a 
more appropriate way of signalling this, rather than the ‘connect and 
manage’ approach under FITs in Germany (see Pollitt and Bialek, 2008).  
 
The correct pricing for transmission capacity also points to the need for the 
UK to look closely at the efficiency of utilisation of transmission assets and 
their operational criteria. The GB transmission system in general operates an 
N-2 safety standard (the system must be operated in such a way that if a 
major link fails it must be capable of handling another similar sized failure) 
and has much less automatic voltage control equipment connected to the 
grid. This suggests that there is scope for operating the assets much more 
smartly in the presence of large scale renewables. For instance the nominal 
rating of Scotland-England interconnectors is around 7 GW, whereas the 
declared capacity is 2.2 GW, this suggests that transmission constraints 
could be made to be less in practice than they might be on paper. 
 
Looking to other countries with TGC schemes it is quite clear that Sweden, 
Australia and New Zealand have avoided the problems of over-payment 
which characterise the ROC scheme in the UK. Clearly these jurisdictions 
have significantly less land use constraints than the UK. Kelly (2007) 
discusses the UK in contrast to Australia and New Zealand. The Australian 
scheme, complemented by an Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator55, 
has much less ambitious targets than the UK scheme, but does not have any 
revenue recycling. The New Zealand scheme has higher targets than 
Australia but is voluntary. The Swedish scheme also does not have revenue 
recycling and is combined with carbon taxes throughout the economy.56 The 
UK would do well to examine the overall carbon reduction incentives in 
Sweden. 
 
Szarka (2006) raises an important issue about policy comparison across 
countries in the case of renewables, suggesting that what policy should be 
aimed at is ‘paradigm change’ not just installed capacity. Clearly what 
                                                 
54 See 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/Trans/ElecTransPolicy/tar/Documents1/20090508%
20derogations%20interim.pdf Accessed 28 August, 2009. 
55 See www.orer.gov.au Accessed 28 August, 2009. 
56 See www.swedishenergyagency.se Accessed 28 August, 2009. 
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matters is where we end up in terms of decarbonisation and what is required 
is radical change to the UK’s energy system. He suggests the real success of 
German policy has been to engage large numbers of individuals in taking 
action on climate change (as investors in local wind farms). This is an 
important perspective, because it suggests that the real failure of UK policy 
is to gain practical support for the sort of changes to the energy system that 
are required. Failure to focus on this aspect of the problem has led to an 
ineffective policy on renewables deployment, which will be more expensive 
than it need have been (due to a combination of under delivery and 
overpayment). 
 
There is also the issue of the stability of policy through time. A concern of 
UK policy makers in setting up the RO scheme was to introduce stability in 
the subsidy regime over a long period, in contrast to the stop-start nature of 
NFFO. However while stability is a desirable goal in itself, this has been an 
excuse for not facing up to the serious deficiencies of the RO scheme. There 
is also little evidence that the UK has had a less stable policy towards 
renewables than countries with high penetration rates of renewables, such as 
Denmark, Germany and Spain, where response to incentives was rapid and 
where there have been significant changes to support policy over time. 
 
Section 6: Explaining what might be right for the UK 
 
If there is a problem with the delivery of onshore renewable capacity in the 
UK – what is to be done about it? Answering this question requires attention 
to the institutional context of the UK (following Rodrik, 2008). The UK’s 
policy context is a liberalised market for a relatively small island with 
concerns about fuel poverty, global warming and energy security. It is clear 
that what is needed is a policy consistent with a liberalised energy market 
and with environmental targets. By contrast Germany is a country which is 
much less committed to liberalised energy markets. It has also much more of 
a focus on a green industrial policy aimed at promoting the manufacturing of 
wind turbines for export. While the UK has paid lip service to this sort of 
objective, the reality is that only 4000 jobs in the UK depend on the wind 
production industry, even in Germany the figure is only 38,00057. It is quite 
clear that for an industry requiring around £1bn of subsidy per year, this is 
not a cost effective job creation scheme.  
                                                 
57 http://www.wind-energy-the-facts.org/en/part-3-economics-of-wind-power/chapter-7-
employment/ Accessed 27 August 2009. 
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The focus should rather be on least cost achievement of environmental 
targets which will be much more important for the competitiveness of the 
UK economy and for incomes and employment. The current ROC scheme is 
clearly far too generous to existing onshore wind and it does not guarantee 
cost effectiveness for offshore wind and marine energy. It is also important 
that the aim of long run cost reduction for technologies that are currently not 
cost effective is maintained and that these technologies must compete with 
nuclear and CCS projects in a reasonable time frame. An important starting 
point for this is the creation of a single high and stable carbon price 
throughout the economy. This would immediately give clear signals to 
nuclear and CCS and provide the backstop technologies against which 
continuing subsidies can be measured. They would also provide the right 
incentives to biomass both in terms of co-firing, landfill gas and waste. 
 
The principle of differing levels of support for technologies at different 
stages of development is also well established and recent moves in UK 
policy to recognise this are sensible and important. What is needed is the 
right mix of RD+D support, competitions and general support mechanisms 
such as an FIT or GTC.  
 
It seems clear that for small schemes a FIT for small scale wind and small 
hydro does offer an attractive mechanism at the low levels of development 
that the UK is currently at and hence current moves in this direction are 
sensible, given high transaction costs in setting up such schemes and 
arranging finance. 
 
For offshore wind it would seem that a NFFO style set of annual auctions 
would offer the best way of keeping prices down. NFFO arrangements could 
be amended to ensure actual delivery, with penalties for non-delivery. 
Indeed given the scale of offshore wind’s potential and the problem of 
finding a suitable level of support initially relative to other sources of 
renewables this would seem to be a good way forward. Bids could take form 
of contracts for differences (as suggested by Ofgem, 2007, for the reform of 
the ROC scheme), whereby bids were for a fixed price for the electricity 
generated, which would be paid at that price minus a reference wholesale 
price, with the payments being levied across licensed suppliers in proportion 
to their supply. This would incentivise efficient location decisions, as 
connection and use of system charges would still be borne by the generators 
and they would be incentivised to maximise the actual wholesale price they 
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received in the market. It would also tie in with successful experience for the 
use of competitions for infrastructure delivery under the private finance 
initiative (Pollitt, 2002). As with any procurement process, which is repeated 
with (potentially) a smallish number of bidders over time, the auctions 
would have to be monitored for collusion between the bidders but given the 
standard nature of the investments and transparency of the bidding strategies 
employed by the players actual or tacit collusion would be easy to spot. 
Annual bid rounds would offer the chance to adjust quantities required and 
other details of the auction easily over time to reflect learning. 
 
For large scale onshore wind the RO mechanism could be made to work, if 
the revenue recycling were removed and the targets adjusted according to 
the expected amount of capacity from offshore wind. This would essentially 
reward onshore renewable generation with a fixed revenue supplement equal 
to the buyout price (assuming the target was not met or exceeded). However 
it remains the case that all renewable capacity should be expected to face the 
full cost of transmission and distribution costs imposed on the system. This 
would encourage optimal siting, local generation more generally, and proper 
competition between renewable supply and demand reduction measures. 
Barthelmie et al. (2008) show that there would be benefits to learning from 
Spain in terms of improving the short term forecasting of wind power 
availability. Improved forecasting might have increased the price of wind 
power received by generators by the order of 14% in 2003.58 
 
In sum the current revenue recycling within the RO mechanism is 
unnecessary and should be stopped. This is line with an early National 
Office Report on the RO mechanism which warned the government that it 
needed ‘to keep a firm grip of the Obligation’s cost relative to other 
instruments for reducing carbon dioxide’ (NAO, 2005, p.4). The system 
needs to be altered with respect to offshore renewables in order to ensure 
least cost delivery of an initially very expensive renewable energy source. 
Large one-off projects like the Severn Barrage or the Thames Barrage 
(associated with a new London airport), if deemed necessary after 
appropriate cost benefit analysis, must be auctioned rather than financed 
within the RO mechanism.59 The RO scheme could further be amended to 
                                                 
58 It might be considered odd that UK wind generators have not done this already given 
the financial incentive to do so, but this may be due to the currently low level of wind 
capacity, relative to some of the fixed costs in setting up such a system. 
59 See Sustainable Development Commission (2007) on potential tidal projects in the UK. 
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remove its all or nothing property by ensuring that in the unlikely event that 
targets were met or exceeded the total amount of subsidy is divided 
proportionately between all those presenting ROCs. This would remove the 
cliff-edge effect on the renewable subsidy of meeting the target. 
 
What the history of UK renewables since 1990 really tells us is that there are 
important institutional barriers to expansion of renewables onshore. These 
are to do with the lack of local benefit from renewable projects that employ 
a small number of people and have a significant perceived amenity impact. 
The key learning from Denmark and Germany is that local populations must 
perceive such projects as of positive benefit to them rather than satisfying 
some distant national policy objective, which they may otherwise support. 
The UK must develop local energy companies that are owned by local 
investors and / or local customers or councils if the potential exploitation of 
local energy resources both wind, biomass, hydro and other technologies is 
to be realised. This is because virtually all renewable electricity and heat 
technologies involve significant local impacts in terms of siting of 
‘industrial’ facilities close to residential areas. 
 
For offshore renewables getting costs down will be the challenge. Costs 
need to come down significantly if energy customers are going to support 
large quantities of them. The current combination of capital grants and 
arbitrary ROC banding is not a satisfactory or sustainable way forward. 
Auctions for new capacity would be institutionally compatible with the 
UK’s liberalised electricity market and offer the prospects of falling prices 
over time. They would also tie in with the auctions to build, own and operate 
offshore transmission lines to the new wind farms that Ofgem is currently 
implementing60. Under Ofgem’s offshore transmission auctions once an 
offshore wind farm has a firm contract for connection to the onshore 
transmission grid an auction will be triggered to build the interconnection 
between the shore and the wind farm. 
 
In the end success, in UK policy towards renewable deployment, must be 
measured relative to other countries in terms of the NPV of the amount of 
renewable electricity generated scaled by the amount of subsidy. While this 
success metric will be difficult to measure at any point along the pathway, in 
the interim success should be measured in terms of the extent to which the 
                                                 
60 See http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/offtrans/Pages/Offshoretransmission.aspx 
Accessed 28 August 2009. 
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maximum amount of renewable generation (adjusted for technological 
maturity) is being supported for the current level of subsidy. UK policy is 
clearly not being successful given the large amount of relatively cheap 
unexploited wind resources in the UK, in the face of overpayment to existing 
renewable generators. A set of policies consistent with the UK’s institutional 
context should clearly aim for consistency with the principles of liberalised 
markets and emphasise the use of competitive mechanisms such as 
appropriately designed capacity auctions for certain types of renewable 
generation. 
 
Section 7: Conclusions 
 
The UK is struggling to develop a coherent set of policies for 
decarbonisation following on from its successful liberalisation of energy 
markets experience. Various authors have suggested that the decarbonisation 
policy is so ambitious that it demands radical institutional changes (Pollitt, 
2008, and Mitchell, 2007). However there is little consensus on what form 
those institutional changes should take. 
 
What is clear is that solutions must target least cost or else the whole policy 
is likely to fail due to the actual cost becoming prohibitive. On the path to 
this sort of ultimate policy failure, large amounts of resources are likely to 
be wasted, to little overall effect and for no benefit to the UK economy or 
the global climate. The UK has had a long history of failed government 
intervention in the energy market and in industrial policy in general (Pollitt, 
2008). It must not continue with this sort of tradition. It has however good 
experience with the role of markets, undertaking basic R+D and the use of 
market mechanisms to deliver public goods. The UK has also particular 
concerns about fuel poverty. This argues for a focus on keeping the costs of 
renewables policy down.  
 
The UK clearly agreed to an ambitious renewable generation target which 
was unnecessarily tough – in terms of the required speed of increase in the 
share - in the face of its EU CO2 targets which could have been met much 
more straightforwardly by a combination of demand reduction and switch 
for coal to gas fired generation (see Grubb et al., 2008). Why the UK got 
itself into this position is unclear, but it clearly hoped that the EU ETS 
would have been much more effective than it has been in supporting 
decarbonisation and that the EU Renewables Directive would be less 
significant than it has become. 
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The UK must also resist calls to see national renewables policy as anything 
other than a policy for delivering learning benefits on the path to cost parity 
with established technologies. An industrial policy based around renewables 
is not a sensible use of national economic resources. No doubt there will be 
some wider industrial benefit to the UK from exploiting its domestic 
renewables potential, however this will arise naturally and should not be an 
objective of policy. The British Wind Energy Association reports that the 
UK is a net exporter of small-scale wind turbines, the part of the market least 
affected by government subsidy.61  What is needed is to move to a more 
competitive energy market where smaller firms compete with large 
incumbents to supply power and to deliver national targets and where the 
capacity to rapidly adopt new lower cost innovations exists. This is essential 
if incumbent costs are to be kept down and oligopoly pricing and excessive 
subsidy regimes are to be avoided. The 40 years from 2010-2050 are very 
likely to see huge technological and lifestyle changes which will 
substantially change the potential picture of the power, heat and transport 
sectors (see Ault et al., 2008a). We must have institutional arrangements 
incentivise potentially drastic innovation within the renewables sector. 
 
The UK must learn from both its NFFO and its RO experience and 
incorporate the learning from both into future subsidy regimes. The evidence 
is that a reformed NFFO type auction could be a sensible way to deliver 
offshore large wind parks mostly built by large multinational utility 
companies. Onshore it is clear that there are legitimate land use issues with 
renewables which can only be addressed by smaller scale projects for local 
public benefit. This policy is in line with some of the more decentralised 
scenarios of the future development of electricity networks and would have 
the added co-benefit of substantially reinforcing the need for paradigm 
change at the individual level and aid behavioural changes which would 
support the optimal use of technologies which would promote energy 
efficiency. Auctions for offshore wind capacity might be useful in setting 
support prices for onshore wind capacity and in giving more certainty in the 
capacity likely to appear on the system. 
 
                                                 
61 See 
http://www.bwea.com/pdf/small/BWEA%20SWS%20UK%20Market%20Report%20200
9.pdf Accessed 27 August 2009. 
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It is also clear that the UK needs to significantly improve the quality of the 
information on which policy decisions are being made. There is a severe 
lack of analysis of the drivers of past policy outcomes, partly as a result of 
the lack of information on the financial characteristics of individual projects 
which have been in receipt of subsidy. We could find no study on the actual 
performance of renewable projects in the UK.  Foxon and Pearson (2007) 
highlight the need for improvements to the process of energy policy making 
whereby analysis is properly used to evaluate policy and policy is revised in 
the light of analysis. One particular area for improvement is in the 
consistency of energy policy between heat, power and transport fuel in terms 
of value of subsidies for carbon reduction, entry barrier reduction and to 
promote learning. 
 
It is also true that the information available to potential (often small scale) 
developers could also be improved with significantly more use of 
geographic information system (GIS) mapping of potential renewable 
energy sites and guidance on acceptable designs and siting rules. This would 
focus developer efforts on sites much more likely to secure local public 
support and get planning permission. This sort of pro-active approach to 
preparing the ground for projects would seem to address some of the calls 
for more joined-up government (e.g. Keirstead, 2007) towards energy policy 
in the UK. This would seem to be important in resolving resource conflicts 
between local community, leisure, defence, air traffic and energy interests. 
 
Finally, a focus on renewables must not detract from the over-riding policy 
aim of decarbonisation of the economy. This requires sensible carbon prices 
and the workings of the price mechanism. In the end it is only against 
sensible time and place varying prices and proper pricing of the carbon 
externality that any given renewables project, with its particular 
characteristics, can be evaluated among the myriad alternatives. While the 
UK’s policies towards renewables may currently be failing to deliver new 
capacity in sufficient quantity to hit long term renewables targets, it is by no 
means clear that those countries that are doing better in this regard are any 
nearer to achieving long term decarbonisation. 
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Table A1: Detailed Government support for renewables 05-08 (incomplete) 
DTI/BERR [1] New and Renewables 
Barriers Busting 
2005-08 52.6m 
 Sustainable Energy 
Capital Grant 
2005-08 96.4m 
 Photovoltaic Grant 
Scheme 
2005-08 19.8m 
 New and Renewable 
capital grant 
2005-07 27.1m 
BERR Total Renewable 
R&D and capital 
grants[2] 
2002-2008 500m 
capital grant 
funding[3] 
2009-2010 50m 
Marine Renewables 
Deployment Fund[4] 
Since 2004 50m 
ETF Fund[2][18] 
[3][7] 
BERR& DECC HFCCAT 
Demonstration 
Programme 
N/A 2008/09 
- 
2010/11 
 
400m 
 
Marine Renewables 
Deployment Fund [4] 
50 m 
Low Carbon Buildings 
Programme [5][6] 
131m 
Offshore Wind Capital 
Grants Scheme 
N/A 
Defra Bio-energy Capital 
Grants Scheme 
N/A 
Bio-energy 
Infrastructure Scheme 
[3] 
10-15m 
Carbon Trust Innovation programme, 
including applied 
research scheme, 
research accelerators, 
technology 
accelerators, and 
incubators [3][8] 
62.4 m 
Funding for new low 
carbon technology 
enterprises, including 
Partnership for 
Renewables [3] 
 
2007- 
2008 
1.6m 
 
Investments in clean 
energy technology 
businesses [3] 
2007- 
2008 
7.3m 
Energy efficiency loans 
scheme for small and 
medium sized 
enterprises [3] 
2007 
- 
2008 
 >21.5m 
Salix Finance public 
sector invest-to-save 
loan schemes [3] 
N/A 
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Carbon trust granted by Defra [3] 
2007-2008 89 m 
2009-2011 250 m 
Research 
Council [3] Energy Program 90m 
ESRC [9] Sussex Energy Group 
April 2005 - March 
2010 2.8m 
 UKERC April 2004 - April2009 3.2m 
 UKERC(TSEC) Since 2004 28m 
 Tyndall October 2000 - April2009 0.8m 
Technology 
Strategy 
Board(TSB) 
[3] 
 since 2004 90m 
Energy 
Technology 
Institute(ETI) 
[3] 
 600 m over next 10 years and 1.1 billion potential, since 2008 
Environment 
Technology 
Fund [3] 
 125 m pa 
Devolved 
Admin 
SCHRI(took over 
by CARES) [10] 3m extra 
Renewable 
Hydrogen & Fuel 
Cell Support 
Scheme [11] 
1.5m 
Scottish Biomass 
Heat Scheme [12] April 2009- March2011 3.3m 
Scottish Ministers’ 
Wave and Tidal 
Energy Support 
Scheme [13] 
13m 
England Regions 
Regional 
Development 
Agencys (RDAs)  
[3] 
2004-2007 59m 
Big Lottery 
Fund 
Community 
Sustainable Energy 
Programm [14] 
 9m 
ROC 
expenditure 
[15] 
 
2005-2006 583.00 m 
2006-2007 718.97 m 
2007-2008 876.41 m 
EU FP [16] For 7 years (2007-2013) At least 2.4 billion Euros  
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Sources: 
 
 
 
 
[1] DTI Department report 2006-2007, http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file40578.pdf 
[2] http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/sources/renewables/business-investment/funding/page19360.html 
[3] UK Environmental transformation fund: Strategy. 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/energy/pdf/etf-strategy080912.pdf 
[4]http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk//energy/sources/renewables/business-
investment/funding/marine/page19419.html 
[5] http://www.lowcarbonbuildingsphase2.org.uk/page.jsp?id=33 
[6] http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/environment/etf/lcbp/page30472.html 
[7] http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/environment/etf/page41652.html 
[8] http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/energy/fund/ 
[9] ESRC Annual Report(2007-2008;2006-2007;2005-2006;2004-2005) 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/about/CI/accounts/ 
[10] http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/scotland/Scotland/Scottish-Community-and-Householder-
Renewables-Initiative-SCHRI?newsletterid=80&archive=0 
[11] http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Business-Industry/Energy/19185/20805/HydrogenSupportIntro 
[12] http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Business-
Industry/Energy/19185/20805/BioSupport/BioSupportIntro 
[13] http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Business-
Industry/Energy/19185/20805/WTSupportScheme/WTSupportSchemeIntro 
[14] http://www.communitysustainable.org.uk/ 
[15] This is the buy-out price multiplied by the size of the obligation. Source: Ofgem 
[16]http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/sources/renewables/policy/european/funding/page23713.html 
